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Developed countries have yet to show a serious commitment to making the required 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions reductions in developing countries, 
especially those with large national emissions, particularly China and India, are also critical 
for an effective international agreement. Both India and China, however, have per capita 
emissions and incomes that are much less than US levels, and are therefore unlikely to be 
willing to commit to emission reductions until the developed countries are clearly committed 
to and have begun taking serious measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Developing 
countries are skeptical, given the lack of evidence of zero-carbon economies, that emissions 
reductions of the necessary global scale would not dramatically constrain poverty alleviation, 
economic growth and human development.    
 
We need a climate regime will allow for global emissions to come rapidly under control, even 
while the developing world vastly scales up energy services in its ongoing fight against 
endemic poverty and for human development. The Greenhouse Development Rights 
framework provides an approach under which this can occur by allocating national shares of 
global obligations on the basis of a combined indicator of capacity (based on income and 




The paper firstly summarises the most recent evidence which indicates the global climate 
crisis is even more severe than that outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) Reports in 2007. It then provides a short review of the failure of our Global 
Environmental Governance systems to effectively address the climate change problem. The 
paper then describes the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) Framework (Baer et al. 
2008), as representing the type of radical approach needed to address the extremely complex, 
multifaceted, wicked problem of climate change. It illustrates the potential economic impact 
of the GDR framework on groups of countries and particular major countries. It then briefly 
compares the GDR approach with some other proposed international approaches or 
frameworks. It concludes with a short discussion of the problems of getting an approach such 
as GDR internationally adopted, despite the urgent need for an emergency response to global 
climate change. 
 
Dangerous Climate Change 
 
“If humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization 
developed and to which life on Earth is adapted, paleoclimate evidence and 
ongoing climate change suggest that CO2 will need to be reduced from its current 
385 ppm to at most 350 ppm. (Hansen et al. 2008, p1)”  
 
The European Union, the International Climate Change Taskforce (2005) and many business 
and civil society groups propose a temperature cap of 2°C to avoid dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system (Baer & Mastrandrea 2006). 
   
“Current proposals to establish caps of 2°C or 3°C as reasonable for avoiding 
dangerous climate change are not being informed by the likely impacts and the 
most recent scientific research, but have been shaped by the world of diplomacy, 




political tradeoffs and compromises driven by narrow, short-term and national 
needs” (Spratt 2007a, p8).  
 
There is little doubt that average global warming of 3°C has a high potential risk of causing 
dangerous climate change. It is also clear that the further below 2°C that we stabilize average 
global warming the lower the risk of dangerous climate change. (Baer & Athanasiou 2004; 
Spratt 2007a).  
 
A recent report that reviews the most recent scientific evidence on setting targets for 
greenhouse gas reductions reaches the following conclusion. 
 
“The only conclusion to be drawn is that the loss of the Arctic sea ice, in all 
likelihood at an increase of less than 1ºC in global average temperature 
compared to pre-industrial levels, unambiguously represents dangerous human 
interference with the climate; and therefore we already have too much greenhouse 
gas in the air, and we need to find the means to engineer a rapid massive 
drawdown of current greenhouse gases to a safe level. It is now not so much a 
question of “how much more greenhouse gas can we add to the atmosphere?” but 
“by what means, at what speed and to what extent can we draw down the current 
levels of greenhouse gases to a safe level?” (Spratt 2007a, p7). 
 
Open ocean waters absorb almost ten times more solar radiation than sea ice, a phenomenon 
known as the ice-albedo feedback (Newton 2007). Scientists have warned for years of the 
potential negative feedback loop from global warming where melting ice and snow expose 
more land and ocean, which then absorb more heat from the sun, triggering further warming 
and snow and ice melt. There is little doubt, that this occurred in the Artic in the northern 
hemisphere summer of 2007 (Spratt 2007b) and again in 2008. 
 
Scientists have demonstrated that we can power our current and future global economy from 
renewable energy sources with minimal greenhouse gas emissions, albeit at a higher cost 
(Sorensen 2004). In view of danger now posed by global warming, the building of another 
coal fired power station could therefore be viewed as a crime against humanity, as there are 
alternatives production sources for electric power already available.  
 
We are now forced to accept some degree of danger, as totally avoiding the risk of dangerous 
climate change completely is no longer feasible. The focus needs to be on decarbonising the 
global economy as quickly as possible while continuing to meet or exceed the poverty 
reduction targets included in the Millennium Development Goals (UN 2005). 
 
“We'd all vote to stop climate change immediately, if we only believed that doing 
so would be so cheap that no country or bloc of countries could effectively object. 
But we do not so believe. Thus we're forced to start trading away lives and species 
in order to advocate a "reasonable" definition of "dangerous" (Baer & 
Athanasiou 2004). 
 
So far, the global political system has failed to deliver effective global policy in response to 
global warming (Barrett 2007). There is a major danger that a weaker precautionary approach 
than that required to minimise the risk of dangerous climate change will be negotiated in 
Copenhagen in December 2009. Many politicians see the huge emission reductions necessary 
as endangering business-as-usual and market driven economic growth in their countries, thus 
threatening their re-election prospects. Mainstream economic analysis (eg, Nordhaus & Boyer 




2000) has also reinforced the idea that only modest emissions reductions are economically 
"efficient." Furthermore, some parts of the fossil fuel industry, directly and through various 
Business NGOs and “independent” think tanks are still keen to further delay policy measures 
to reduce emissions despite the planetary emergency caused by their products 
(Exxonsecrets.org 2006; Hansen 2007; Union of Concerned Scientists 2007). The global 
financial crisis is now also being used by politicians and some business groups as reasons for 
delaying action.  
 
The Failure of Global Climate Change Policy 
 
In 1988, the Toronto Conference on the Global Atmosphere, hosted by the Canadian 
Government and attended by many eminent climate scientists and government officials from 
many countries, concluded “humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled and globally 
pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear 
war” (Bodansky 1994, p49). The Conference recommended a 20% reduction in global CO2 
emissions from 1988 levels by the year 2005.  As the Conference Statement states, since 
developing countries will need to increase their energy use “significantly,” industrialised 
countries would therefore need to reduce their emissions by more than 20% by 2005 in order 
to achieve this global target (Bodansky 1994). 
 
In 1990, the IPCC published its First Assessment Report which “predicted that if states 
continue to pursue „business as usual,‟ the global average surface temperature will rise by 
0.3C per decade…a rate of change unprecedented in human history” (Bodansky 1994, p57) 
This was despite successful attempts at the final IPCC plenary session by the US, Saudi and 
Soviet delegations, encouraged by the fossil fuel industry, at “watering down the sense of the 
alarm in the wording, beefing up the aura of uncertainty” (Leggett 2001, p15). 
 
Despite these and many subsequent warnings, our current global environmental governance 
process has failed to provide an effective response to global warming. By 2007, global 
greenhouse gas emissions were more than 30% above 1990 levels (IPCC 2007) and since 
2000, CO2 emissions have been increasing at a faster rate (Raupach et al. 2007) and global 
average temperatures continue to rise (IPCC 2007). Given this failure, is there reason to hope 
that the current negotiations based on the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 2008) due to be 
concluded  at the Conference of the Parties on the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in December 2009 will be successful? In the lead up to the negotiations, 
Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC said “Politicians have to act on the 
information provided by the science” (Willkinson & Skehan 2007). Politicians have, however, 
failed to act effectively on the science for almost 20 years. 
 
The current indications are that the negotiations scheduled to be concluded in December 2009 
in Copenhagen will not deliver sufficient emission reductions to ensure that we avoid more 
than 2°C of average global warming over pre-industrial levels. Underlying the Bali Action 
Plan on which these negotiations are based is an oft-cited target for 25-40% reductions by 
developed countries by 2020. Given that now 50% of global emissions are not from 
developed countries and these emissions are growing (IPCC 2007; Raupach et al. 2007), the 
outcome of Copenhagen  looks unlikely to get global emissions to begin reducing by 2015, 
widely argued to be the minimum that is required to put the earth on a pathway to avoid 
dangerous climate change (Baer & Mastrandrea 2006; Spratt 2007a). 




What is Needed? 
 
The science is quite clear; the more quickly we reduce greenhouse gas emissions the more 
likely we are to avoid more serious dangerous climate change. As discussed previously we 
already have dangerous human interference with the climate. The key issue is how we 
minimize the risk of more severe and dangerous climate change. Our current economy is 
currently emitting over 100 million tonnes of global warming pollution into the atmosphere 
every day. The ideal therefore would be to stop all human activities that result in greenhouse 
gas emissions tomorrow; that would, however, result in social and economic chaos, so it is not 
a feasible option. Given that science shows that we should cut greenhouse gas emissions as 
much and as quickly as possible, the critical question is how quickly can we cut greenhouse 
gas emissions without causing social and economic chaos and how do we get international 
agreement to do this?  
 
Human ingenuity, creativity and problem solving abilities are immense given the opportunity 
to address a challenge, such as landing a man on the Moon or a robotic vehicle on Mars. To 
address the climate emergency, we need to create a framework that encourages all nations to 
cooperate to address the emergency while ensuring that those on the planet who are struggling 
to find food, clothing and shelter are not adversely affected by the redirection of the world 
economy towards rapid decarbonisation. As is shown in Figure 1 it will require substantial 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by both Annex I (developed countries) and 
developing countries (non-Annex I) in order to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases at a level likely to avoid 2°C of warming.  
 
 
Figure 1: Non-Annex 1 emissions also have to reduce substantially - based on  
(Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2008, p2). 
 
Under the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the developed (Annex I) 
countries aimed to return emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels. Very few of the 
Annex I countries have achieved this and in the case of the largest emitter among Annex I 
countries, the US, its greenhouse gas emissions were by 2005 16% above 1990 levels. The 
Annex I countries have yet to show a serious commitment to making the required reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions, particularly the US which has not committed to meeting even 




the modest Kyoto Protocol reduction targets. This is making it harder to get an effective 
international agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Developing countries, especially those with large national emissions, particularly China and 
India, are also critical for an effective international agreement. Both India and China, 
however, have per capita emissions that are less than one-quarter of US levels and are 
therefore unlikely to be willing to commit to emission reductions until it is clear that the 
Annex 1 countries are clearly committed to and have begun to take serious measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Different approaches to the negotiations are also likely to be taken 
by the non-Annex 1 countries.  
 
What is needed is a climate regime that will allow for global emissions to come rapidly under 
control, even while the developing world vastly scales up energy services in its ongoing fight 
against endemic poverty and to enable human development. Developing countries will, quite 
reasonably, refuse to pay the additional costs of low-carbon energy technology until their 
most pressing human development needs have been met and the ongoing global poverty crisis 
brought under control. An effective agreement therefore has to have a mechanism whereby 
those with the capacity to pay and the responsibility for emissions already in the atmosphere 
provide the financial and technological assistance necessary to safeguard the right to 
development. 
 
Precautionary Approach – Greenhouse Development Rights 
 
One framework that may be effective in helping to engender the international cooperation 
needed to address the climate emergency is the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) 
framework, as it aims to overcome the inherent critical tension between the global climate 
crisis and the global development crisis. Given the most recent scientific reports, the GDR 
proposal‟s initial target of holding global warming below 2°C will need to be strengthened, 
resulting in an emergency climate protection pathway that reduces emissions even more 
steeply than the 2°C emergency pathway shown in Figure 2. This pathway still has a 17-36% 
risk of breaching the critical 2°C limit. It will not stabilise the climate at well below 2°C; it 
does, however, still require substantial global emission reductions of up to 6% pa starting in 
2015 (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2007).  
 
In Figure 2, the top line is a „Business-as-Usual‟ trajectory, which extrapolates the historical 
approach to energy conservation, renewables, fossil fuel subsidies, pollution controls etc and 
is based on the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2007) projections.  The second top line is 
a „No-Regrets‟ emission reductions trajectory.  This represents the reductions in global 
emissions that can be achieved if all the emission reductions were implemented where the 
benefits (value of energy savings) equals or exceeds the costs incurred to achieve them (Baer 
et al. 2008).  These represent free and profitable emission reductions, which are large, though 
far from large enough to bring emissions all the way down to the 2°C emergency pathway, the 
bottom line.  





Figure 2: The ‘mitigation gap’ (middle wedge) between a ‘No-Regrets’ baseline (line at 
bottom of top wedge) and the 2ºC emergency pathway’ (bottom of middle wedge) - 
adapted from (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2007, p37).  
 
What might be reasonable goals for a pathway more consistent with the most recent risk 
estimates? An emergency stabilization pathway of a 50% reduction of global greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2025 and a transition to a decarbonised economy by 2050 are targets consistent 
with setting stretch goals to harness and direct humanity‟s expertise, knowledge and resources 
to achieve this task. It can also be viewed as a backcasting approach which enables policy-
makers to consider how to get to a desired end-point (Mander 2001; Robinson 2003).  
 
The GDR approach provides a framework for implementing an internationally agreed 
emergency stabilisation pathway of emission reductions while safeguarding the right of all 
people to reach of dignified level of sustainable human development. This standard of living, 
which could be described as that of a „global middle class,‟ is significantly higher than the 
global poverty line, but lower than the northern middle-class standard (Baer, Athanasiou & 
Kartha 2008, p3).  
 
It does this by recognising the right to development and the corresponding right to be exempt 
from global emission reductions as belonging to poor people, not to poor countries. It then 
aggregates individuals to quantify national responsibility and capacity to act and uses this to 
calculate national obligations to pay both the costs of an emergency mitigation program to 
reduce emissions and to fund strenuous adaptation efforts. This is done for all countries in a 
manner that takes income disparities within countries into explicit account. By so doing, it 
seeks to secure for the world‟s poor the environmental space and resources needed for low-
carbon development (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2008, p4).   




Capacity to Contribute to Addressing Climate Emergency 
 
The GDR framework allocates to the wealthy and high emitting consumers in the developed 
and developing countries, the costs required to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
to fund adaptation. It does this by identifying the proportion of the country‟s population that is 
above the specified development threshold (US$7500 per capita income purchasing power 
parity (PPP) adjusted) and therefore has the capacity to contribute to the measures necessary 
for the climate emergency. This is illustrated below for three countries, India, China and 
USA. The US$7500 level of the development threshold is just below the global average per 
capita income in 2005 (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2007, p29). 
 
 
Figure 3: Capacity/Development need chart for India, China and the US in 2005,  with 
$7500 income per capita (PPP) development threshold - based on (Baer, Athanasiou & 
Kartha 2008, p4) 
 
In Figure 3, the length of the x-axis is proportional to the population. At each point on the x-
axis, this curve shows the income of the corresponding percentile (one percent) of the 
population, measured in US dollars per capita (PPP adjusted).  The top section representing 
capacity to fund mitigation and adaptation can therefore be directly compared. It shows that 
almost all of the US population have the capacity to contribute and also that China also has a 
significant population with the capacity to contribute. Australia shows a similar pattern to the 
US, with over 90% of the population above the threshold. 27% of the world‟s population in 
2005 were above this development threshold with almost 15% of these living in high-income 
countries and 11.5% in medium-income countries. Less than 1% were from the low-income 
countries where 37% of the world‟s population live (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2007, p31). 




Historic Responsibility  
 
The GDR framework proposes that cumulative per capita CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
consumption since 1990 is a reasonable measure of historic responsibility, largely because 
emissions made prior to this date were usually made in ignorance of their harmful effects, and 
because of the high correlation between wealth and total emissions since the industrial era 
began. Figure 4 shows this measure of responsibility for selected countries and regions; the 
total bar is the total national cumulative emissions figure (from 1990 project to 2010), while 
the darker bar includes the adjustment to account for the exclusion of emissions below the 
development threshold. The adjustment is straightforward, based on the assumption that 
(within any given country) emissions are proportional to consumption, which is in turn 
proportional to income (Worldwatch Institute 2002). 
 
Figure 4:  Cumulative per capita CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, 1990-2005; 
‘responsibility adjusted to account for the exclusion of emissions below the development 
threshold - adapted from (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2007). (EU 27 – European Union – 
27 member states; EITs – Economies in Transition (Eastern Europe); LDCs – Least 
Developed Countries – as defined by UN) 
 
This then raises the question of how capacity, as defined in the previous section, and 
responsibility should be combined into a single obligation indicator, which can then drive the 
allocation of the global responsibility to each country.  
 
The Responsibility and Capacity Indicator (RCI) 
 
The GDR framework‟s “Responsibility and Capacity Indicator” (RCI) is developed in order 
that among countries with the same capacities but different responsibilities, the country with 
greater responsibility has the greater obligation. It also ensures that among countries with the 
same responsibility but different capacities, the one with the greater capacity must have the 
greater obligation. There are many formulae, which have this property. The preferred 




approach uses a simple weighted sum of responsibility and capacity, in a way that allows 
different weights to be given to each: 
RCI = aR + bC 
It specifies that the weights a and b sum to 1, which confers the property that, as the paired 
weights go from a=1 and b=0 towards a=0 and b=1, the RCI goes from being exactly equal to 
responsibility (R) to being exactly equal to capacity (C) (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2007, 
p41). 
 
In the reference case shown in Table 1, the GDR Framework uses a = 0.5 and b = 0.5, which 
weights capacity and responsibility equally. This is just one of many possible choices of 
possible weightings for capacity and responsibility.  
 
Table 1: Global percentage shares of population, income, and capacity, cumulative 
emissions, responsibility, and RCI for selected countries and groups of countries – based 
on Baer et al. (2008)  
 
GDR results for selected countries and groups of countries  











RCI (%) RCI (%) RCI (%) 
EU 27 7.3 30,472 28.8 22.6 25.7 22.9 19.6 
France 0.9 33,953 4.1 2.3 3.2 2.8 2.3 
Germany 1.2 34,812 5.6 5.3 5.4 4.7 4.0 
United 
Kingdom 
0.9 34,953 4.2 3.2 3.7 3.2 2.7 
United States 4.5 45,640 29.7 36.4 33.1 29.1 25.5 
Japan 1.9 33,422 8.3 7.3 7.8 6.6 5.5 
Russia 2.0 15,031 2.7 4.9 3.8 4.3 4.6 
Australia 0.3 33,880 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.4 
China 19.7 5,899 5.8 5.2 5.5 10.4 15.2 
India 17.2 2,818 0.7 0.3 0.5 1.2 2.3 
Brazil 2.9 9,442 2.3 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 
South Africa 0.7 10,117 0.6 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.2 
Mexico 1.6 12,408 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 
LDCs 11.7 1,274 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Annex I 18.7 30,924 76 78 77 69 61 
Non-Annex 1 81.3 5,096 24 22 23 31 39 
High Income 15.5 36,488 77 78 77 69 61 
Middle 
Income 
63.3 6,226 23 22 22 30 38 
Low Income 21.2 1,599 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 
World 100  9,929 100%    100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
 
One notable feature of these results is that the US has the largest share of global capacity, the 
largest share of global responsibility, and the largest share of combined RCI.  However, this 
result is extremely important, in that by any reasonable standard of common but differentiated 
responsibilities (as agreed under the UNFCCC), the United States would have to pay the 




largest share of the global climate „bill.‟ But, despite the fact that the American people have 
largely come to accept the need for concerted action to stabilize the climate, that action is still 
conceived in almost entirely domestic terms. Indeed, when it comes to preparing the ground 
for US international obligations, the American climate movement has largely failed, having 
barely begun to even explain the necessities of emergency global action to its people (Baer, 
Athanasiou & Kartha 2007).  
 
Calculating national bills for climate change mitigation and adaptation 
 
The overall global cost of mitigation and adaptation is hard to estimate, however, the 
following table gives an estimated cost per 1% of GWP (Gross World Product) that is 
required to fund the combined cost of mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. If 2% of 
GWP is required the cost would be double this, 3% of GWP triple this etc. 
 
Table 2: GDP, capacity, and obligation, projected to 2020 - these figures assume that the 
total cost of the global climate program is 1% of projected GWP, or about $944 billion 
















EU 27 $19,327 $15,563 80.5% $ 216 1.12% 
France $ 2,647 $ 2,161 81.6% $ 26 1.00% 
Germany $ 3,568 $ 2,961 83.0% $ 45 1.25% 
United Kingdom $2, 685 $ 2,205 82.1% $ 30 1.13% 
United States $18,177 $15,661 86.2% $ 275 1.51% 
Japan $  5,071 $  4,139 81.6% $   62 1.23% 
Russia $  2,905 $  1,927 66.3% $   41 1.40% 
China $13,439 $  5,932 44.1% $   98 0.73% 
India $  5,814 $     972 16.7% $   11 0.19% 
Brazil $  2,535 $  1,376 54.3% $   16 0.64% 
South Africa $     706 $     422 59.8% $   10 1.42% 
Mexico $  1,744 $  1,009 57.9% $   15 0.84% 
LDCs $  1,549 $       82 5.3% $     1 0.06% 
Annex I $50,368 $40,722 80.8% $ 652 1.29% 
Non-Annex I $44,037 $18,667 42.4% $ 292 0.66% 
High Income $49,279 $40,993 83.2% $ 655 1.33% 
Middle Income $41,546 $18,190 43.8% $ 286 0.69% 
Low Income $  3,579 $     206 5.8% $     3 0.08% 
World $94,405 $59,388 62.9% $ 944 1.00% 
 
The wide range of these national obligations reflects the widely different degrees of 
responsibility and capacity in different countries. These figures make no assumptions about 
the fraction of any national obligation that could reasonably be discharged domestically, as 
opposed to internationally. A range of institutional, political and governance mechanisms 
would be necessary were such obligations to be codified in international law, collected, and 
actually channeled toward mitigation and adaptation activities. 
 
Military budgets of the world‟s major economies represent 2% of GWP and global consumer 
expenditure on “luxuries” as opposed to necessities is even higher. A spending of a similar or 
even higher level is easily justified to defend the world against the danger of climate change. 




The GDR framework gives an approach on how the global costs of mitigation and adaptation 
could be reasonably fairly shared. National Greenhouse Gas Emission Targets 
 
As is shown in Figure 4, which is based only on CO2 emissions, USA and China are clearly 





Figure 5: CO2 Emissions in 2006 (in million tonnes – Carbon) –(Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency 2009) based on  UNFCCC and IEA 
 
The rankings of some countries change when emissions associated with land-use change, 
particularly deforestation, are included: by this measure, Indonesia and Brazil would be 
included  in the top ten emitters (Worldwatch Institute 2009).  
The example of the United States 
 
Figure 5 shows a similar calculation for the US to the global reductions projection shown 
earlier. But instead of showing a reduction wedge that thickens to 6% per year (reflecting the 
global rate in the climate emergency trajectory), it shows an even more ambitious USA 




domestic reduction trajectory that reduces national emissions to 90% below 1990 levels in 
2050. Even this ambitious „90% by 2050‟ trajectory would only satisfy a portion of the USA‟s 
total obligation, the rest of which would have to be satisfied by funding international 
reductions (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2008). 
 
 
Figure 6: The US business-as-usual trajectory, reference trajectory, mitigation 
obligation, and emission allocation - based on (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2008, p7), p7. 
 
Beyond its no-regrets reductions (top dark shaded wedge), US mitigation obligation includes 
domestic reductions (lightly shaded wedge - 2nd from top), showing reductions that will bring 
emissions to 90% below 1990 levels by 2050) and international reductions funded by the US 
(cross-hatched wedge), which together fulfill the US mitigation obligation. 
The example of China 
 
The complement to the situation illustrated above for the USA is China, the world‟s second 
largest national emitter of greenhouse gases. Due to the much lower RCI calculated for China 
(shown in Table 1) its national mitigation obligations are smaller than the 6% per annum 
reductions required globally by the emergency 2ºC trajectory.  






Figure 7: China’s emissions including mitigation funded by other countries  
- based on (Baer, Athanasiou & Kartha 2008, p7) 
 
Here, again, the top dark shaded wedge represents no-regrets reductions. The „Business-as-
Usual‟ trajectory (the top of this dark wedge) is taken as an extrapolation of China‟s historical 
emissions growth, a choice that seems appropriate given its atypical rate and recent 
momentum. But note that China‟s domestic mitigation obligation, calculated as it is on the 
basis of China‟s RCI, is not particularly large, despite the projected continuation of China‟s 
unusually rapid economic growth. The bottom striped wedge represents mitigation in excess 
of China‟s obligations that are required to reduce China‟s emissions in a manner consistent 
with the global 2ºC emergency pathway. 
 
In Figure 6, we also see what GDRs seeks to achieve – a hypothetical instance in which a 
large amount of additional emissions reductions (the bottom striped wedge) are made within 
China, but financed by wealthy developed countries in need of offsets. These reductions are 
absolutely necessary, for China‟s emissions are large, and making full use of its mitigation 
potential is essential if we are to keep within the climate emergency trajectory. Fortunately, 
under the GDRs framework, there is a strong incentive for China to reduce beyond its national 
obligation by, in effect, selling mitigation potential to wealthy and middle-income countries 
such as those in the EU and the USA that need it to fulfill their mitigation obligations. Or, to 
put it another way, in a cap and allocate system, China would, in principle, be able to sell 
reductions at an international price that is greater than its marginal cost and by so doing earn 
the revenue needed to finance its own required reductions, at least partially and perhaps 
wholly.  
 
The GDRs framework is, regrettably, outside the spectrum of proposals now being negotiated 
for a post-2012 regime. But at the same time, it is clear to put in place an effective 
international climate change regime that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions as quickly as is 
needed to minimise the risk of dangerous climate change will require honesty, boldness and a 
radical approach. In this context, the GDR framework can serve as a useful standard of 
comparison − a „reference framework‟ that clearly marks out a set of essential core elements, 




elements that must be a critical part of any even potentially successful international post-2012 
climate regime. 
 
Could this type of agreement be achieved? 
 
The evidence so far does not look promising. In July 2009, the G8 included in its Declaration 
that: 
 
“We recognise the broad scientific view that the increase in global average temperature 
above pre-industrial levels ought not to exceed 2°C. Because this global challenge can only be 
met by a global response, we reiterate our willingness to share with all countries the goal of 
achieving at least a 50% reduction of global emissions by 2050, recognising that this implies 
that global emissions need to peak as soon as possible and decline thereafter. As part of this, 
we also support a goal of developed countries reducing emissions of greenhouse gases in 
aggregate by 80% or more by 2050 compared to 1990 or more recent years. “(G8 2009, para 
65) 
The major problem with the G8 Declaration is that even taking 1990 as the base year (the 
emission levels target would be higher if more recent years were taken) the 50% reduction in 
global emissions would only give about a 50% chance of staying below the 2°C temperature 
increase that based on the science the G8 leaders acknowledge as important. This 50% chance 
of limiting the warming to 2°C becomes less if the peak in emissions is later (eg 2020 rather 
than 2015). These estimates are based on the emission scenarios and their likelihood to 
maintain global average temperature below 2°C included in High Stakes: Designing emissions 
pathways to reduce the risk of dangerous climate change (Baer & Mastrandrea 2006). It is 
again therefore looking likely that our Global Climate Change Public Policy Process will fail 
to provide an effective policy outcome with a policy approach that has an estimated 50% 
chance of avoiding dangerous global warming being endorsed by the G8 leaders.  
 
As outlined previously, we need rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions to begin as 
soon as possible if we are to minimise the risk of dangerous climate change. Due to the 
problem mainly being caused by the fossil fuel emissions of the developed world, it is 
reasonable that the developed countries cover most of the costs of moving the world to a 
decarbonised economy and of funding adaptation to the global warming already caused.  
 
Given that this will require massive investment in energy efficiency, renewable energy 
technologies and other technologies in all countries of the world, the challenge will be to get 
the political leaders and citizens of the developed countries to accept the responsibility to fund 
the transition not only domestically but also in the developing world. Appropriate governance 
mechanisms will also be required to ensure that the funds are effectively spent on reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and appropriate adaptation. Many problems have already occurred 
with the projects funded under the Clean Development Mechanism(CDM) of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Carbon Trade Watch 2005).  
 
The climate crisis also suggests that we are likely to have to finally acknowledge that there 
are limits to economic growth, and begin to re-direct the global economy from GWP to global 
happiness and quality of life in order to achieve Ecologically Sustainable Development 
(Czech 2000; Daly 2003). These will therefore represent the type of radical changes to our 
current system of international political economy required to avoid dangerous climate change.  




How does GDR compare with other approaches? 
 
There have been many different kinds of proposals for global climate policy frameworks that 
resemble GDRs in some fashion, going back to the idea of equal per capita entitlements that 
emerged around 1990 (Agarwal & Narain 1991; Grubb 1989). A series of more-or-less 
detailed proposals for “multi-stage” frameworks were developed in the years between the 
Bonn/Marrakesh accords in 2001 and the Bali Action Plan in 2008 (Climate Action Network 
2004; Climate Protection Programme GTZ 2004; Höhne, den Elzen & Weiss 2006). And as 
we discuss below, new attention has been drawn to responsibility-based allocations, including 
frameworks based on equal cumulative per capita emissions rights.  
 
A comparison of GDRs with these frameworks would highlight a few key similarities and 
differences. Crucially, all of these approaches take it for granted that equity is an 
indespensible aspect of an international climate agreement, and that responsibility, capacity 
and need should in some way govern fair burden sharing.  
 
The ideal of equal per capita emissions rights still has a wide appeal as an ethical norm and 
the basis for practical policy (e.g.,Singer 2009). India in particular has focused on the idea of 
equal current per capita allocations by agreeing that it will never exceed the average of Annex 
I per capita emissions [1]. The well-known “Contraction and Convergence” approach 
continues to enjoy a substantial following, particularly in the UK [2]. However, given the 
small carbon budget associated with a high likelihood of staying below even 2ºC of warming, 
there simply isn‟t enough “environmental space” for the necessary growth in energy use in the 
developing countries under an equal per capita approach (to say nothing of slow convergence) 
(Baer et al., 2008). 
 
One obvious response - and not at all new - is to argue that allocations should be based on 
equal cumulative per capita emissions. A variety of gestures at such a basis for the allocation 
of emissions rights has come from Chinese researchers and policy-makers recently (e.g., Teng 
2009 ), and the idea also underlies strict historical responsibility calculations such as those 
presented recently by the Bolivian delegation in the context of mitigation obligations 
(UNFCCC 2009, p44).  
 
One very important feature that GDRs shares with cumulative per capita approaches is the 
possibility of negative emissions allocations for wealthy or high per capita emissions 
countries. The concept of negative allocations can appear counter-intuitive and politically 
implausible, but it‟s important to realize that, given common assumptions about the 
economics of mitigation, negative allocations are effectively just a further increase in 
monetary costs. Indeed, a system in which an industrialized country has a net negative 
allocation - on the assumption of tradeability of emissions rights - looks little different in 
economic terms from one in which a positive allocation of emissions rights is combined with 
an additional funding obligation for mitigation in developing countries. 
 
A variety of other specific proposals for "burden sharing" or the allocation of emissions rights 
have also been published in the last few years, most drawing on the same basic possibilities 
for equity principles (see Baer and Athanasiou, 2007). Most of these seem to be of primarily 
academic interest, as it were. However, it is important to note that the particular trajectory of 
the UNFCCC negotiations, which is speeding towards Copenhagen with the North/South 
impasse unresolved, constrains the discourse about equity severely. Proposals that might work 
today must essentially preserve the Annex I/Non Annex I distinction, which plainly is no 
longer an adequate map of global responsibility and capacity. If we are able to "cross the 




Copenhagen bridge," if you will, a much broader range of possibilities for principle-based 
burden sharing will emerge, and previously marginal approaches might become credible. 
 
For the time being, the GDR approach is particularly useful in highlighting the „equity‟ 
dimension of the climate change problem and in providing a reference framework against 
which other proposals developed in the international negotiations can be assessed. Without an 
unprecedented level of global cooperation, the 2°C emergency pathway, or anything like it, 
will quickly recede out of range. To effectively address climate change will require an 




The effective international agreement that is urgently required to avoid dangerous climate 
change will require a much greater willingness to cooperate and more radical policies than 
those adopted so far in the international climate change agreements. Such an agreement – 
likely only fully achievable after a bridging agreement of some kind in Copenhagen – needs 
to provide an effective mechanism, such as the GDR framework, whereby those with the 
capacity and responsibility fund decarbonised development for the global poor. In 
Copenhagen the developed countries need to make a clear commitment to do this as well as 
committing to dramatically reduce their own emissions. But in a more comprehensive 
agreement, something which also fairly allocates obligations to the wealthy in the developing 
countries will be necessary. 
 
The GDRs framework represents the type of ambitious approach that is necessary to gaining 
international agreement to implement the emergency climate program necessary to avoid 
dangerous climate change. It compares favourably with other frameworks proposed for the 
post-2012 period, particularly in terms of environmental justice issues for the global poor and 
it therefore provides a viable framework for substantially reducing the risk of dangerous 
climate change. The problems with having it adopted are more political and governance issues 
rather than technical feasibility. This or a similar radical approach to changing the 
international political economy is also required to move humanity towards Ecologically 




This paper obviously draws heavily on the Greenhouse Development Rights framework and 
thus is indebted to the whole project and its supporters, especially co-authors Tom 
Athanasiou, Sivan Kartha and Eric Kemp-Benedict. Any remaining errors of fact or opinion 




[1] See for example the text of the speech by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on release of 
India‟s Climate Change Action Plan on June 30, 2008, available at 
http://pmindia.nic.in/lspeech.asp?id=690. 
 
[2] See the website of the Global Commons Institute, http://www.gci.org.uk 
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online. The server of this web 
pages is powered by 100% 
ecologically produced energy 
(hydropower).
 
Prof. Walter Leal 
ICCIP's Director
This first decade of the 21st 
Century has shown how much 
still needs to be done in respect 
of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation efforts, but also in 
respect of communication, 
education and training on 
climate change. Therefore, the 
Decade 2011-2020 needs to be 
the "Decade of Climate Change 
Education, Awareness and 
Training" and ICCIP will be 
running various projects and will 
organise many activities, to 
achieve this goal. 
Past conferences and publications
Events
●     22nd April 2009 (Hamburg, Germany) Specialist Seminar on Ships Emmissions and 
Climate Protection: challenges, action needs and innovative approaches 
(Fachseminar "Schiffsemissionen und Klimaschutz: Herausforderungen, 
Handlungsbedarf und innovative Ansätze"). This event will be held in the German 
language. 
●     5th June 2009: "European Climate Teach-In Day" 
 
University lecturers and teachers from 265 institutions in more than 55 countries 
used the opportunity to download the climate content provided in the framework of 
the First European Climate Teach-In Day 2009. Over 12,000 students from 
universities and schools were involved in the initiative. 
The organizers are pleased that this first Climate Teach-In Day has in fact reached 
students and staff from universities, schools and other research and education 
institutions well beyond the European area. A follow-up activity will be the "World 
Climate Teach-In Day", to be held on Friday, the 4th June 2010. 
●     5-9th July 2009 (Istanbul, Turkey): "Global Conference on Global Warming" 
●     28-30th October 2009 (Hamburg, Germany) Third European Fair on Education 
forSustainable Development. Theme: "Renewable Energy and Climate Change: 
Thematic Challenges to European Schools and Universities". 
 
●     2-6 November 2009: "Climate 2009" 
 
●     9 December 2009: International Climate Change Information Programme at COP 15 
- parallel session on "Climate Change and Sustainable Water Management" 
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the "Decade of Climate Change 
Education, Awareness and 
Training" and ICCIP will be 
running various projects and will 
organise many activities, to 
achieve this goal. 
Climate Change Studies Library
In the context of ICCIP a Climate Change Studies Library has been established. This is a 
one-stop site where information on studies and reports are available and can be 
downloaded. This site will facilitate access to information on research and studies on 
climate change and allows contacts with the agencies performing such studies, hence 
increasing accessibility and know-how transfer. 
"Interested persons/organisations are kindly invited to apply with their studies/reports for 
incorporation in the website (info@iccip.net)." 
1.  Kyoto Protocol 
2.  UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008 - Fighting climate change: Human 
solidarity in a divided world 
3.  IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Synthesis) 
4.  Bali Action Plan - Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, 
held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007. Part One: Proceedings 
5.  Bali Action Plan - Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, 
held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007. Addendum. Part Two: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its thirteenth session. 
6.  Multi-Stakeholder Guide 
7.  Estimating total power consumption by servers in the U.S. and the world 
Estimating regional power consumption by servers: A technical note 
8.  Climate Change Futures: health, ecological and economic dimensions 
9.  Colorado: Assessing the costs of climate change 
10.  German Watch - The Climate Change Performance Index 
11.  US Economic Impacts of Climate Change and the Costs of Inaction 
12.  econsense Climate Policy Map - interactively creating maps on climate policy with 
one click 
13.  Combating Climate Change: An International Cooperation Framework Beyond 2012. 
A consensus paper by legislators from the G8 and +5 countries. 
14.  Adapting to Climate Change 
15.  Climate Change and Security: Challenges for German Development Cooperation 
16.  Europeans' attitudes towards climate change 
17.  Environmental Improvement Potentials of Residential Buildings (IMPRO-Building) 
18.  Germany in the midst of climate change: Adaptation is necessary 
19.  Urban Responses to Climate Change a focus on the Americas 
20.  Global Change Research in Germany 2008 
21.  Ground-level ozone in the 21st century: future trends, impacts and policy 
implications 
22.  Ground-level ozone in the 21st century: summary for policy makers 
23.  Global warming in the twenty-first century: An alternative scenario 
24.  Impacts of Europe's changing climate 
25.  Trees, poverty and targets - Forests and the Millennium Development Goals by 
James Mayers, International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED) 
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69.  Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States 
70.  Trade and Climate Change 
71.  Climate Change Information for Effective Adaptation 
72.  German Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change 
73.  Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons from the 
Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health 
74.  Implications of climate change for Australia's World Heritage properties: a 
preliminary assessment 
75.  UNEP Climate Change Strategy 
76.  Climate in Peril: A popular guide to the latest IPCC reports 
77.  Kick the habit 
78.  The natural fix? The role of ecosystems in climate mitigation 
79.  Energy efficiency and the finance sector 
80.  Financing a Global Deal on Climate Change 
81.  Improving public health responses to extreme weather/heat-waves 
82.  Improving public health responses to extreme weather/heat-waves - EuroHEAT 
83.  Assessing the costs of adaptation to climate change 
84.  How is climate change affecting our health? 
85.  Financing Adaptation 
86.  Convenient Solutions to an Inconvenient Truth: Ecosystem-based Approaches to 
Climate Change 
87.  Impact on Agriculture and Costs of Adaptation 
88.  Shaping Climate Resilient Development - A Framework for Decision-making 
89.  CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 
90.  Towards sustainable production and use of resources: Assessing Biofuels 
91.  One Year On - Many Countries Factoring Environmental Investments into Economic 
Stimulus Packages 
92.  Climate Change Science Compendium 2009 
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95.  Water in a changing world 
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100.  Climate Changes, Water Security and Possible Remedies for the Middle East 
101.  Water and Climate Change in Québec 
102.  What we need from the Copenhagen Climate Summit - and are unlikely to get! 
103.  The role of education and training in achieving social and political outcomes for 
climate change adaptation in Australia 
104.  Europeans' attitudes towards climate change 
105.  Corporate Reporting on Water Risk 
106.  The Implications of Climate Change on Water 
107.  Climate Change and Water 
108.  Cities in a post-2012 climate policy framework 
109.  Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change 
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